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Lack of trust is identified as one of the main constraints on online environments, particularly in terms of consumer protection. 
Although the elements that contribute to building trust can be identified in broad terms, there are still many uncertainties in 
defining and establishing trust in online environments. This paper investigates these uncertainties by studying the relationship 
between trust and the risk perceptions of users. We discuss issues such as trust as an economic good, risks to procedural fairness, 
and the relationship between the two. We posit that without an organizational policy governing fair use of personal information, 
organizations face the risk that information used inappropriately by a single employee or by a single department can have 
negative consequences for the entire firm. We stress the need for organizations to consider user perceptions of risk when 
establishing trust with their customers, and we show that economic decision-making in online environments without 
consideration of trust and risk is not likely to result in optimal choices.  
Keywords: cyber security, economics, perception, policy, positional good, risk, trust 
____________________________________________________________________________________ 
1. Introduction 
Online environments provide a venue for people and organizations to perform many activities, including:  
x  Providing, gathering and sharing information, 
x  Meeting and interacting with others, and  
x  Performing transactions of various kinds. 
This work was supported by the Economics of Cyber Security project of the Institute for Information Infrastructure 
Protection (I3P) under award number 2003-TK-TX-0003 from the Office for Domestic Preparedness/Office of 
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Inherent in each of these activities is some type and level of trust. We can think of trust in at least three 
ways, corresponding to the three pillars of cyber security (Pfleeger and Pfleeger 2007):  
x  Confidentiality: Online actors trust that information (particularly identity) will be kept 
confidential when such confidentiality is promised. 
x  Integrity: Online actors trust that information posted is correct, and that information 
provided by the actor will not be changed or falsely attributed. 
x  Availability: Online actors trust that information and systems will be available when 
needed. 
Indeed, online trust has economic benefit: people and organizations will pay to ensure a desired degree of 
trust. However, high degrees of trust can be expensive, as evidenced by resources devoted to preventing 
cyber attacks, monitoring computer systems, detecting unwanted behavior, mitigating the effects of 
attacks, and cleaning up the problems they cause. For this reason, online actors often determine 
(intentionally or not) an acceptable balance between trust and risk. In this paper, we explore the 
relationship among trust, risk and economic behavior. We show that, to understand trust and risk in online 
environments, we must understand the multidisciplinary nature of cyber security economics and online 
behavior. 
 
2. The Meaning of Trust 
Trust necessarily involves two parties: one who is trusted, and one who is trusting. Thus, we can think of 
each party as having two trust-related characteristics: being trustful (i.e. willing to trust another person or 
organization) or being trustworthy (i.e. engendering the trust of someone or something else). (Pelligra 
2005) Moreover, trust can characterize relationships within an organization as well as those crossing 
organizational boundaries.  To see how trust functions online, we first explore notions of trust in general.  Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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  How do individuals construct a basis for trust? One traditional answer to this question is that 
people search for signs of objectivity and fairness, and perhaps also for signs of competence and 
expertise. According to this formulation, a person who is judged trustworthy by one should be judged 
trustworthy by all (Earle 2004). The alternative approach contends that trust is based on specific, locally 
defined manifestations of similarity and agreement rather than on universally accepted criteria. This 
formulation contends that trustworthiness is a matter of individual judgment that varies across persons, 
contexts, and time.  
We often consider trust as a function of civil and criminal law, but in fact it also derives from the 
norms of a civil society. These norms are conveyed in interpersonal interactions, often moderating or 
preventing negative behaviors, such as fraud. For example, (Rabin 1993) has shown that payoffs depend 
not only on players actions but also on their intentions.  The intention is determined not only from what 
players do but also from what they can do but do not. Norms can act to deter a player from taking an 
unpopular, unethical or even illegal action.  In cyberspace, norms are sometimes difficult to determine, 
but online trust certifications and systems (such as eBay assurances, Better Business Bureau ratings, or 
amazon.com reviews) attempt to capture actor behavior and provide surrogate measures of trust. 
Similarly, jargon is related to normative group expectations.  Shared meanings, specialized terminology, 
and the consonance of assumptions underlying group discussions can lead to familiarity and trust among 
team members. (Gui 2005) Such shared terminology is often found in listservs or specialized web sites. 
Several researchers highlight characteristics that can affect whether and how we trust a person, 
good or service. Baker (1987) and Jones (1996) suggest that trust is a personality trait, and Baier (1986) 
and Gambetta (1988) claim that there is an element of probability involved when one person or 
organization decides to trust another.  Pelligra (2005, p. 113) makes a convincing argument that 
interpersonal relationships create and enhance trust: Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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A trusting move induces trustworthiness through an endogenous modification of [someones] 
preference structure.  A single act of genuine trust may provide additional reasons to behave 
trustworthily.  
Pettit (1995) describes how traits displayed by the party to be trusted are determined by self-
interest: e.g., the desire to be admired by others. As trust become more valued, it grows. 
Following the norm of trust has an effect on both the beliefs and the norms of others. It creates a 
virtuous circle  if we act as if we expect the best from the others, they will often behave better 
as a result. Baron, (1998, p.411). 
This need to be thought well of by others is also called therapeutic trust. Horsburgh (1960, p. 
346) describes how it affects economic decisions: One of the reasons for [As] willingness to risk the 
loss of his money is a belief that this may induce [B] to act more honorably than he originally intended. 
 
3. Trust as an Economic Good 
Trust and its associated characteristic, legitimacy, are important and related constructs that affect 
economic relations between individuals and organizations.  Legitimacy is a particular kind of trust that 
can determine how firms interact with one another.  When Aldrich and Fiol (1994) examined the 
difficulty associated with being a new firm in a new industry, they found that one of the largest challenges 
was a lack of legitimacy.  This finding contrasts with traditional economic theory, which asserts that firms 
decide whether to enter or exit markets based on the risks and trade-offs of the decision.  Moreover, 
legitimacy can affect the terms of exchange in bargaining situations.   Because regulators and the media 
are much more likely to confer legitimacy on firms that fit the common image of organizations in their 
field, firms tend to behave alike (Deephouse 1996).   
In cyberspace, legitimacy is signaled by association with membership groups such as the Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), through credentialing systems such as the Certified Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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Information Systems Security Professionals (CISSP), or by conforming to the Software Engineering 
Institutes Capability Maturity Models (SEI-CMM). Somewhat paradoxically, the process is sometimes 
more useful for signaling legitimacyfor example, in the context of government software contracts
than it is for actually improving the factors that could enhance that legitimacy, such as improving 
software quality outcomes. 
Economists call trust a positional good, because people are willing to pay more for goods and 
services they trust.  It is positional in that we can say that one entity is more trusted than another, and 
position in the marketplace can be influenced by the degree of trust. Moreover, trust plays out in 
economic interactions through interpersonal relationships.  By this, we mean the forms of human 
interaction in which the identity of the participants as particular human beings has affective or cognitive 
significance. Gui and Sugden, (2005, p. 2). 
Conventional economic theory models the behavior of rational agents, characterized only by, 
and motivated only by, their preferences and beliefs; in consequence, it recognizes only the 
cognitive dimensions of interaction between its agents. This methodological strategy, one might 
say, treats all interactions as impersonal. In contrast, a recurrent theme in recent work on 
economics and social interaction is the idea that interpersonal interaction involves the 
communication of dispositions or sentiments that are affective or visceral in nature. (Gui and 
Sugden, 2005, p. 13). 
Gui and Sugden (2005b) suggest two reasons why trust in interpersonal relations matters for 
economics.  First, when trusting relationships occur inside an (economically-based) organization, they can 
affect economic performance by reducing both the time and the cost of a transaction. This activity is 
evident in many ways related to cyber security.  For instance, usually less stringent technical monitoring 
and protections are needed when the organizations members know and trust each other. Second, when 
good relations occur outside the organization, trust can encourage strong economic performance by 
providing material and emotional support for starting entrepreneurial initiatives. (Allen 2000). Trust can Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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lead to faster economic growth (Zak and Knack 2001), and trusted interpersonal relationships can become 
channels for sharing and transmitting economically valuable information (Topa 2001). 
However, McAllister (1995) found that although good personal relationships are associated with 
higher levels of trust, a history of competence, reliability, and even credentials are necessary for gaining 
trust in organizations. Recognition of these qualities typically precedes strong interpersonal relationships.  
Jones and George (1998) suggest that, in addition to trusting in peoples abilities, understanding other 
workers intentions led to better organizational performance by improving knowledge exchange, 
involvement, and communication of tacit operating procedures. 
 
4. Risk Management in Various Industries and Business Sectors 
Risk is defined as the possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage, or destruction (Webster 1986) and its 
relevance varies over various industry segments (Daniels and Spafford 1999). Many different approaches 
to risk management are used in business and government sectors, including general business, banking, 
environmental agencies, and medical services. This section presents a brief review of some of the more 
relevant approaches.   
A typical approach for project management in general is presented by Mundt, who describes a 3-
dimensional constraint matrix that represents the impact of each risk, the likelihood that it will occur, and 
the difficulty in detecting it (KPMG 2005). Shtub et al. (1994) discusses the major steps of risk 
management as consisting of 1) risk identification, 2) risk quantification, 3) risk response development, 
and 4) risk response control.  Smyth presents a decision tree approach to recommend building 
modifications to minimize damage from earthquakes (Smyth 2003). A probabilistic approach is used to 
estimate changes in damage from different levels of structural strengthening. The decision tree approach 
is well known for its applicability to a variety of decision-making situations (Raiffa and Schlaife 1961). 
However, its application to specific problems requires much care and considerable experience. For 
example, Kunreuther (2001) discusses the problems of risk assessment and risk perception for extreme or Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
7 of 31 
  
rare events. He recommends the use of exceedance probability curves for use in the assessment process. 
For other situations, fault tree analysis is an elaborate version of the decision tree approach used for 
reliability analysis of systems involving hardware, software, human involvement, and environmental 
factors (Henley and H. Kumanota 1981, Kapur 1982). 
Multi-attribute utility (MAU) functions represent another approach (Keeney and Raiffa 1976). 
The challenge in applying MAU is to develop the trade-off curves among risks, costs, and other relevant 
factors. 
Muermann (2002) differentiates between the credit and operational risk to a financial 
organization. Credit risk can be approached with statistical methods, and high-risk clients can be charged 
higher loan interest rates. Similarly, firms can engage in currency hedging and interest rate swaps to 
protect against well-known dangers. For operational risks, which are idiosyncratic and less frequent but 
threaten potentially greater damage, a different approach is needed. In this case, classifying the risks 
reveals the underlying risk structure. An internal definition process is proposed, whereby banks 
dynamically adjust to new incidents. 
For the insurance industry in the UK, a three-dimensional approach is recommended that reflects 
x  Consequences  Both threats and opportunities, 
x  Probability of occurrence  Threats, and  
x  Probability of occurrence  Opportunities (IRM 2002).  
A range of techniques is recommended for performing the detailed analysis, including event tree 
analysis, statistical inference, and real options, but no examples are provided. Kleindorfer (2004) presents 
an approach to dealing with environmental damages with reference to the Clean Air Act Amendment. He 
describes statistical associations among facility characteristics, accident rates and severity, regulatory 
programs in force, community demographics, and the debt/equity ratio of the parent company. The results 
of such a statistical analysis can be used to guide preventive and corrective actions. A similar approach is 
described by Elliott for statistical associations between county demographics and the accidental release of Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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toxic or flammable chemicals in facilities located in those counties (Elliott 2004). Abdel-Rahman (2000) 
discusses a similar approach for deciding on actions to address potential ecological damage to both 
wildlife species and humans. The methodology includes the steps of 1) problem formulation, 2) toxicity 
evaluation, 3) exposure estimates, 4) risk calculations, and 5) assessment endpoints. 
Michel-Kerjan (2002) discusses more complex situations involving infrastructure networks and 
interdependent networks, where a global approach is needed to address such threats. He cites several 
examples, among them: The loss of hydro-electric power in Quebec Province in 1998 as an example of an 
unforeseen disaster that required unprecedented mitigation efforts, and the failure of the international 
communications satellite Galaxy IV, which caused 45 million pagers and 600 radio stations to stop 
working.  Such vulnerabilities present unique challenges in prediction and loss prevention. 
One of the other factors that can affect an organizations attitude towards risk is its basic risk 
tolerance. Broadly defined, risk tolerance is the amount of risk an organization is willing to accept in 
pursuit of value [CSO 2004]. That is, risk tolerance can be defined as the amount of risk an organization 
is able to accept, manage, and optimize effectively (McCarthy and Flynn 2004). It reflects the 
organizations risk management philosophy, in turn based on the organizations culture and operating 
style. An organizations risk tolerance in evaluating strategic alternatives, setting related objectives, and 
developing mechanisms to manage related risks, can be measured either qualitatively or quantitatively:  
 
x  Quantitatively: The risk is calculated using the normalized certainty equivalent. The analyst 
determines the decision makers attitude toward risk by performing a utility analysis, or by assessing 
historical actions of the business in practice. For example, Howard (1988) defines certain guidelines 
for determining a corporations risk tolerance in terms of total sales, net income, or equity.   
According to Howard, reasonable values of risk tolerance appear to be approximately 6.4 percent of 
total sales, 1.24 times net income, or 15.7 percent of equity.  These figures are based on Howards 
observations in the course of consulting with various industries; the approach has received attention Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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from the decision and risk management community [Clemen and Reilly 2001, Kirkwood 1997,  Soo 
Hoo 2000).    
x  Qualitatively: Management asks illustrative questions to elicit characteristics of the risk posture. 
Then, risk is expressed using a risk map, where the impact and likelihood of a given action are rated 
as low, medium or high.  For example, a manager may ask, What level of capital or earning is the 
organization willing to put at risk at a given a particular confidence level? 
 
5. Risk Management in Information Systems 
Perhaps the most important reason for both businesses and consumers to refrain from establishing and 
participating in Internet-based information systems is the lack of trust and the potential for loss of assets 
and privacy caused by potential security breaches in such systems (Gordon 2002). A review of cases 
prosecuted by the Department of Justice, including the evaluation of damages and financial awards, 
shows a significant negative market reaction to information security breaches involving unauthorized 
access to confidential data, but no significant market reaction when the breach does not involve access to 
confidential data (Campbell 2003). This finding is consistent with the findings of the 2006 CSI/FBI 
survey, which suggests that among information security breaches, serious financial losses were related to 
the theft of proprietary information and unauthorized access (Gordon 2005).  
The literature review also indicates that compromised firms, on average, lose approximately 2.1 
percent of their market values within two days surrounding the compromise events (Cavusoglu 2002). 
This study suggests that smaller firms are penalized more than larger ones. However, initial investigations 
by other researchers indicate that, in some business sectors in the long term, stock prices rebound 
relatively quickly. Clearly, there are some market penalties for security breaches, and the literature 
indicates that Internet firms are penalized more than conventional firms, perhaps because of the formers 
dependence on the Internet to generate revenue. Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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Researchers have attempted many times to classify security threats; see, for example (Landwehr 
et al. 1993, Lipmann et al. 2000, Neumann 1989, Schneier 1996). The ISO standard 7498-2 (ISO 1989) 
lists five security control measures to combat these threats: 
x  Authentication, 
x  Access control,  
x  Data confidentiality,  
x  Data integrity, and  
x  Non-repudiation.  
This classification is widely accepted among computer security experts. We believe that, although 
these classifications address the most important computer security threats, the proposed classification 
schemes have two disadvantages: they do not cover all threats, and they do not allow threats to be 
considered independently.  
Software development projects can use a risk exposure matrix to organize and understand the 
risks facing them (Williams 1999). The matrix characterizes various possible project outcomes with 
respect to performance, support, cost, and schedule. Project managers or risk analysts offer a workshop in 
which participants score the various risk types and then relate them in a hierarchical interrelationship 
digraph. Next, each risk is matched with a selection of mitigation measures. Carnegie Mellon University's 
Software Engineering Institute (CMU) takes a more general approach to software risk (CMU 2006). 
Similarly, the National Institute of Technology (NIST) and International Standards Organization (ISO) 
recommend two general approaches for selection of control measures: 
1.  Baseline approach. The minimum level of security defined by an organization is selected for each 
type of information system. Then, baseline security is achieved by implementing a minimum set 
of control measures known as baseline control measures 
2.  Selection based on security concerns and threats. This approach requires more in-depth 
assessment for the selection of effective and suitable control measures. It provides support for Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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that selection by taking into account the high level view of security concerns (according to the 
importance of the asset) and likely threats. 
In its guidelines on computer incident handling (Grance 2004) NIST also recommends the ISO 
approach and encourages organizations to create written guidelines for prioritizing incidents. According 
to NIST, prioritizing individual incidents, a critical step in the incident response process, can be based on 
the following: 
x  Criticality of the affected resources (e.g., public Web server, user workstation) 
x  Current and potential technical effect of the incident (e.g., root compromise, data destruction). 
The likelihood of a potential vulnerability to be exploited by a given threat-source can be described as 
high, medium, or low (Stonebumer 2001): 
x  High likelihood. The threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable, and controls to 
prevent the vulnerability from being penetrated are ineffective.  
x  Medium likelihood. The threat-source is motivated and capable, but controls are in place that may 
impede successful exercise of the vulnerability. 
x  Low likelihood. The threat-source lacks motivation or capability, or controls are in place to 
prevent (or at least significantly impede) the vulnerability from being exercised. 
 
An extended version of this approach is used in the probability assessment of security incidents, as 
described in Farahmand et al. (2005).  A different approach is presented by Camp and Wolfram (2004), 
which recommends a formal pricing mechanism for externalities to encourage organizations to respond to 
security threats and vulnerabilities. Such an approach would improve regulatory and market mechanisms 
by putting the burden of security costs on the information service provider. The Information Assurance 
Technical Framework Forum (IATF) of the National Security Agency (NSA) is also attempting to 
organize a framework for technical security countermeasures and information assurance solutions that Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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meet customers needs and foster the development and use of solutions that are compatible with the 
framework (IATF 2006). 
 
6. Risks to Procedural Fairness and Trust 
Information systems business experts argue that organizations can address privacy and trust concerns and 
gain business advantage (for example, through customer recruitment or retention) by observing 
procedural fairnessthat is, the perception by an individual that a particular activity in which he or she is 
a participant is conducted fairly (Culnan 1993, Lind and Tyler 1988, Milberg et al. 2000, Smith et al. 
1996). In this sense, fairness means the Principles of Fair Information Practice  suggested by a federal 
commission in 1973 that provides the basis for the U.S. federal privacy law enacted in 1974 [ware 1973]. 
The practices include: 
1.  Notice/Awareness. Consumers should be informed of an organizations information practices 
before asked to supply any personal information. The scope of the notice should include: 
x  Who will collect the data 
x  How the data will be collected 
x  Whether supplying the data is mandatory or voluntary, and the consequences of 
refusal 
x  To what uses the data will be put 
x  Who might receive the data 
x  How the datas confidentiality, integrity and quality will be protected 
2.  Choice/Consent. Presenting options about how the collected information may be used, including 
secondary uses. 
3.  Access/Participation. How an individual can access the data, not only to view information but 
also to contest its accuracy and completeness. Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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4.  Integrity/Security. The data must be accurate and secure, with protection not only against loss but 
also against unauthorized access, modification, destruction or use. 
5.  Enforcement/Redress. The mechanisms available to enforce the principles and provide redress. 
Procedural fairness is perceived as providing the consumer with a voice, and giving a consumer 
control over actual outcomes (Folger and Greenberg 1985, Lind and Tyler 1988). From this perspective, 
customers are assumed to be willing to disclose personal information and have that information used 
subsequently to create consumer profiles for business use when fair procedures such as these are in place 
to protect individual privacy.  Studies indicate that individuals are less likely to be dissatisfied even with 
unfavorable outcomes if they believe that the procedures used to derive those outcomes are fair (Folger 
and Bies 1989, Greenberg 1987, Lind and Tyler 1988). Pavlou and Gefen (2005) explain psychological 
contract violation (PCV) as a buyers perception of having being treated wrongly regarding the terms of 
an exchange agreement with an individual seller. 
Moreover, studies on trust suggest that individuals are willing to disclose personal information in 
exchange for some economic or social benefit subject to the privacy calculus, an assessment that their 
personal information will subsequently be used fairly and they will not suffer negative consequences 
(Milne and Gordon 1993, Stone and Stone 2003). For example, a survey of Internet users conducted by 
researchers at Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia 1996) found that 78 percent of the survey 
participants would be willing to provide demographic information about themselves to the owner of a 
web site if a statement was provided regarding how the information was used. Only 6 percent of the 
participants would not disclose demographic information under any circumstances.  In general, 
individuals are less likely to perceive information collection procedures as privacy-invasive when  
x  Information is collected in the context of an existing relationship,  
x  They perceive that they have the ability to control future use of the information, 
x  The information collected or used is relevant to the transaction, and  
x  They believe the information will be used to draw reliable and valid inferences about them.   Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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While the literature on customer service has not specifically addressed privacy, it has established a link 
between being treated fairly and customer satisfaction (Schneider and Bowen 1995). 
 
7. Trust and Cyber Security 
Many online organizations create trust by investing in cyber security practices and products.  Table 1 
describes the results of a survey of U.S. businesses where respondents describe their reasons for investing 
in cyber security. Although many are reacting to regulatory requirements or audits (the first and fourth 
categories, respectively), more than half (i.e., the remaining categories) derive from a need to trust their 
computer systems. 
 
Table 1.  Influences on Cyber Security Investment Strategy (Adapted from [88]) 
Categories of Influence  Average Percentage Across 
Responding Organizations 
Regulatory requirement  30.1 % 
Network history or information technology 
staff knowledge 
18.9 % 
Client requirement or request  16.2 % 
Result of internal or external audit  12.4 % 
Response to current events, such as media 
attention 
8.2 % 
Response to compromised internal security  7.3 % 
Reaction to external mandate or request  5.0 % 
Other 1.7  % 
 Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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Indeed, the security of information systems is challenged by the proliferation of Internet-based 
applications, including electronic commerce and a variety of information brokering services. The growth 
in spending on cyber security occurs in a variety of areas, including software to detect viruses, firewalls, 
sophisticated encryption techniques, intrusion detection systems, automated data back up, and hardware 
devices (CERT 2006). Studies by the Computer Security Institute report that approximately 90 percent of 
respondent organizations detected computer security breaches with losses averaging over 2 million dollars 
per organization (Gordon 2005).  In contrast, companies only spend 0.047 percent of their revenues on 
security (Geer and Soo Hoo 2003), suggesting that many firms are taking risks by not adequately 
investing in information security.  
Why is this so? A literature review indicates that most cyber security research focuses on the 
technical defenses (e.g., encryption, access control, intrusion detection, and firewalls) associated with 
protecting information (Anderson 1972, Daniels 1999, Sandhu et al. 1999, Schneier 1996). However, 
until recently (with the advent of the five Workshops on the Economics of Information Security, WEIS), 
little comprehensive research addressed how organizations should: 
x  Assess the damages of past security incidents, 
x  Evaluate the risk of vulnerability to security incidents, 
x  Prepare for facing security incidents by selecting appropriate control, measures, given the 
resource constraints of finances, manpower, and software tools, and  
x  Train security personnel to better prepare for dealing with security incidents. 
Limited data exist to describe the extent to which organizations invest in cyber security 
particularly to increase trust.  The general cost of information systems security incidents is described in 
Anderson (2001), Butler (2002), Cohen (1991), Dobson (1994), Orlandi (1991), Tarr (1995) (See Pfleeger 
et al. (2006) for a discussion of available cyber security data). In 2007, the U.S. Bureau of Justice 
Statistics will reveal the results of the first large-scale, comprehensive survey of cyber security 
investment. Using a rigorous sample of 36,000 U.S. businesses, the data should provide benchmarks Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
16 of 31 
  
about the number and type of cyber attacks, the nature and degree of investment in products and 
processes, and more (Office 2006). 
Nevertheless, problems remain. For example, after a breach, often the damage is invisible, its 
extent delayed or unknown. Some researchers, such as Gordon and Loeb (2002), have suggested using 
return on investment techniques to determine an optimal level of cyber security investment, but others 
such as Willemson (2006) have argued against this approach. Other researchers, such as Rowe and 
Gallagher (2006), describe two distinct investment strategies: fixed cost and fixed security.  In the first 
case, an organization determines how much money it can spend on cyber security, and then tries to 
maximize the amount of security it can get for that sum. In the second case, an organization determines 
how much security it needs, and then spends whatever sum is necessary to achieve that level of security. 
Similar perspectives can be taken with trust, where an organization either creates as much trust as it can 
for a given sum, or spends whatever is necessary to reach a given level of trust. 
Kim and Benbasa (2003) organized key trust-related issues in Internet stores into four categories 
of personal information: product quality, price, customer service, and store presence.  Based on a study of 
eBays and Amazons online auction marketplaces, Gefen and Pavlou (2006) show that the impact of trust 
on transaction intentions will increase as the buyers perceived regulatory effectiveness increases from 
low to medium levels, but it will decrease as the buyers perceived effectiveness increases from medium 
to high levels. They also show the perceived regulatory effectiveness of the online marketplace is 
hypothesized to reduce the impact of perceived risk on transaction intentions.  
Farahmand et al. (2005) suggest that breaches of trust are considered to be the most serious cyber 
offenses. They conducted personal interviews with law enforcement agencies dealing with computer 
crime and with executives from variety of industries dealing with security issues. In addition, they did a 
literature review of cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice, including the evaluation of damages 
and financial awards. Consistent with the prior research Camp and Wolfram (2004) found a significant 
negative market reaction to information security breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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data, but no significant market reaction when the breach does not involve access to confidential data. 
Surveys such as CSI/FBI Survey (Gordon 2005) reveal that, among information security breaches, 
respondents consider the most serious financial losses to be those related to theft of proprietary 
information. This finding is also consistent with computer cases recently prosecuted by the Computer 
Crime and Intellectual Property Section (CCIPS) of the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of 
Justice. According to CCIPS, 91 percent of the cases prosecuted under the computer crime statute, 18 
U.S.C. 1030, are those related to violation of information confidentiality. For example, in November 
2001, two former Cisco Systems, Inc., accountants were sentenced to 34 months in prison for illegally 
issuing almost $8 million in Cisco stock to themselves: a clear breach of trust. 
Thus, breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential information are quite different from 
attacks that do not involve access to confidential information. Once confidential information has been 
accessed in an unauthorized manner, the value of such a strategic asset may be permanently 
compromised. For example, a firms customer list may be an important proprietary asset. Once this list 
has been accessed without authorization, others may be able to use the list for marketing and other 
purposes, permanently damaging the lists value to the firm that created it. When breaches do not involve 
unauthorized access to confidential information, the underlying assets generally relate to operations. 
 
8. Trust and Risk in Cyberspace 
The importance of confidentiality indicates that trust and risk are intertwined when organizations decide 
on cyber security investments.  Pavlou (2003) integrates trust and risk as well as variables of the 
technology acceptance model into a research model.  It is not often that firms have the luxury of making 
fixed security or fixed trust investments. Rather, managers ask their information technologists, How 
much security can I get for my IT budget?  Thus, an organizations growing dependence on information 
technology, and particularly on online environments, carries with it a concomitant risk of adverse effects. Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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The role of economics is to help mitigate the risk. Viewed in this light, it may be more appropriate for 
organizations to perform risk-benefit rather than cost-benefit analysis, especially when trust is an essential 
characteristic of important relationships. 
There is a rich literature on risk (see, for example Hollander and Mayo (1991)) that describes 
many aspects of risk that affect decision-making. For example, Starr (1969) derives several laws of 
acceptable risk, including: 
x  The acceptability of risk is approximately proportional to the cube of the benefits. 
x  The public is willing to accept risk from voluntary activities (such as driving a car or 
opening an electronic attachment) at a level 1000 times greater than from involuntary 
activities (such as extreme weather events). 
x  The acceptable risk is inversely related to the number of people exposed to the risk. 
Starr bases his work on historical record. However, Fischoff et al. (1978) point out that what is 
accepted in the market may not accurately reflect the publics preferences. Indeed, some companies take 
greater risks in cyberspace or in financial markets, assuming that the cost of a breach or error is simply 
the cost of doing business. Moreover, many users of an online environment may not understand its 
technological underpinnings and relationships, so that market behavior may not indicate what a 
reflective individual would decide after thoughtful and sensitive inquiry. Thus, rather than evaluate risk 
and trust based on preference revealed from past history, Fischoff et al. (1978) suggest using perceived 
and expressed preference, based on administration of questionnaires. 
Fischoff et al. (1978) investigated perceptions of risk, and particularly ways to determine when a 
product is acceptably safe. Their findings are equally applicable to determining when a product or process 
is acceptably trustworthy. In this section, we describe their findings and discuss how they relate to online 
trust. 
The participants in the Fischoff study were asked to rate an activity or technology on nine seven-
point scales, each of which could influence risk perception (Lowrance 1976): Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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x  Voluntariness 
x  Immediacy of effect 
x  Knowledge about the risk 
x  Control over the risk 
x  Novelty 
x  Chronic or catastrophic 
x  Degree of dread 
x  Severity of consequences 
 
The researchers found that activities with the most dread and with certain severe consequences (in 
this case, certain fatality) were deemed to need the most risk reduction. In addition, if risk is adjusted to 
an acceptable level, then higher risks are tolerated for old, voluntary activities with well-known and 
immediate consequences. Finally, for any given benefit, greater risk was tolerated if it was voluntary, 
immediate, known precisely, controllable and familiar. 
These results translate easily to a consideration of trust.  The nine degrees of risk can be recast as 
characteristics of a trust relationship between actors A and B: 
x  Voluntariness: Does A choose to trust B (e.g. when providing credit card information 
online), or must A choose B (e.g. when employee A is directed by manager B to use a 
particular online service)  
x  Immediacy of effect: When does As trust in B result in a clear effect? 
x  Knowledge about the risk: Does A know the risk of trusting B? 
x  Control over the risk: Can A control the conditions under which B is trusted? 
x  Novelty: Does A already know B and have an established trust relationship and history? 
x  Chronic or catastrophic: If B turns out not to be trustworthy, how many people are 
affected? Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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x  Degree of dread: If B turns out not to be trustworthy, can A calmly deal with the 
consequences? 
x  Severity of consequences: If B turns out not to be trustworthy, are the results irreversible? 
Thus, trust relationships involving the most dread and with certain severe consequences (from 
misplaced trust) may need the most risk reduction. We have seen that breaches of confidentiality are 
considered the most severe.  So systems to engender or enforce trust online should focus first on 
protecting confidentiality.  This is no mean feat, considering that online environments cross national 
boundaries, with each nation having different privacy statutes.  
The Fischoff results suggest which online trust relationships will be the most comfortable. In 
addition, if trust involves risk at an acceptable level, then higher risks are tolerated for established trust 
relationships involved in voluntary activities with well-known and immediate consequences. Moreover, 
for a given level of trust, greater risk is tolerated if the trust relationship is voluntary, with results that are 
immediate, known precisely, controllable and familiar. Thus, the Fischoff results provide guidelines for 
the best ways to establish online trust relationships. 
In turn, the Fischoff results suggest effective paths to economic gain.  Since trust is an economic 
good that is clearly essential to online interactions, improved online trust relationships reduce risk and 
encourage more online economic transactions.  
 
9. Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper was to show that economic decision-making in online environments 
without consideration of trust and risk is not likely to be optimal. Arrow (1971) posits that even though it 
should be rational economic behavior to cheat or disregard trust, agents exhibiting trust and confidence 
are an essential part of a successful economy. He also recognizes that to improve efficiency, trust can be Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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enhanced via non-market controls, which can be endogenous (the inherent qualities of individuals) or 
exogenous (provided by third parties). 
High trust results in lower cost, higher efficiency, minimal contracting, and a minimum of transaction-
monitoring. Indeed, a high level of trust enables a high level of risk taking, because trust is the mirror 
image of risk: high trust suggests low perceived risks (Pauline 1999). For example, long term trading 
partner relationships can be sustained only via positive trust. However, the use of power among trading 
partners may affect them for a short period of time. Thus, acquiring and using power effectively and 
positively is necessary for success in organizations, at least for maintaining trading partner relationships, 
particularly online. 
Guerra et al. (2003) suggest four strategies that meet the demands of information economy to enhance 
trust in online environments:  
Identity establishment.  Establish both the personal authentication of the consumer by the online supplier 
and trust in the identity and reputation of the supplier by the consumer.   
Third-party certification.  Reveal information about characteristics that cannot be otherwise observed by 
individuals.  
Loss insurance.  Limit the potential damage caused to a consumer in an online transaction 
Legal frameworks. Reduce temptation by making illegal activities expensive, and use different regulatory 
and legal frameworks to address different trust concerns.  
Recognizing the importance of trust and understanding the dynamics of the system that destroy 
trust has vast implications for how we approach risk management in the future. Slovic (1993) explains 
that early studies of risk perception demonstrated that the publics concerns could not be blamed simply 
on ignorance or irrationality. Instead, many of the publics reactions to risk could be attributed to a Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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sensitivity to technical, social, and psychological qualities of hazards that were not well-modeled in 
technical risk assessments (e.g., qualities such as uncertainty in risk assessments, perceived inequity in the 
distribution of risks and benefits, and aversion to being exposed to risks that were involuntary, not under 
ones control, or dreaded). The important role of socia1 values in risk perception and risk acceptance thus 
became apparent. There is a lot to learn from previous research on users perceptions of risk of different 
technologies. However, we should acknowledge the active role of users in online environments that 
differentiates information technology from many other technologies. In online environments, users 
actually operate the technology, something that almost never happens in other situations, such as nuclear 
power (Sjöberg and Fromm 2001). 
We stress the need for organizations to consider user perceptions of risk when establishing trust 
with their customers. To address this need, organizations should align users perception with their 
organizational policies. Efforts should be made to develop a standardized approach to trust and risk across 
different domains to reduce the burden on consumers who seek to better understand and compare policies 
and practices across these organizations. This standardized approach will also aid organizations that 
engage in contractual sharing of consumer information, making it easier to assess risks across 
organizations and to monitor practices for compliance with contracts, policies and law.  
It is important for individuals to observe that a particular activity in which they are participants is 
conducted fairly and addresses their privacy concerns. This observation also gives customers confidence 
in fair procedures and makes them more willing to disclose personal informationand to allow that 
information subsequently to be used to create consumer profiles for business use.  
Thus, it is essential to monitor user perceptions. A promising approach to studying perceptions of 
hazards associated with technologies employs the psychometric paradigm, using psychophysical scaling 
and multivariate analysis techniques to produce quantitative representations or cognitive maps of risk 
attitudes and perceptions. The nine characteristics (e.g., immediacy of effect, newness, control, etc.) 
hypothesized by various authors to influence judgments of perceived and acceptable risk have been found Farahmand, Pfleeger, Spafford, Trust and Risk and Economic Benefits in Online Environments    
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to be highly interrelated and can be effectively reduced to the two dimensions of dread and unknown risk. 
However, policy makers must observe that there is a difference between perceived risk and acceptable 
risk that indicates dissatisfaction with the way that market and regulatory mechanisms have balanced risks 
and benefits.  
We posit that trust is an organizational and multidisciplinary issue. Without an organizational 
policy governing fair use of personal information, organizations face the risk that information used 
inappropriately by a single employee or by a single department can have negative consequences for the 
entire firm. In this regard, the United States Public Policy Committee of the ACM (USACM) advocates a 
proactive approach to privacy and trust policy by both government and private sector organizations, and 
recommends that organizations consider minimization, consent, openness, access, accuracy, security, and 
accountability in dealing with the personal information of online users Spafford (2006). 
There are many practices and processes that can be implemented today to engender and promote 
these characteristics. Organizations can implement fair and trustworthy systems in a cost-effective way by 
using de-identified data, aggregated data, limited datasets, narrowly defined and fully audited searches. At 
the same time, we can work to develop new technologies to establish and protect trust while minimizing 
risk in online relationships and interactions.  
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